Friday, July 10, 2009
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Monday, February 16, 2009
GAPENA SAMPAI LAPORAN POLIS KERAJAAN LANGGAR PERLEMBAGAAN Desak Hishamudin Letak Jawatan
The so-called 152 street protest - or Feb 15 rally - which wasmooted last month, did not go ahead today. However, Gapena went to Brickfields police station to lodge a report with about 50 supporters in tow to show their support for the cause.
Section 17 (1) of the Education Act states that Malay language, being the national language, should be the language of instruction for all education institutions except for vernacular schools.
Article 152 (1) of the constitution states that Malay language is a national language and no one has the authority to stop the use of Bahasa Malaysia in schools.
Monday, January 26, 2009
BERITA DARI INDONESIA
ANTARA menyediakan layanan RSS Feed sesuai standar yang ditetapkan RSS working group.
Layanan RSS ANTARA dapat diakses pada URL-URL berikut:
Terkini
http://www.antara.co.id/rss/news.xml
Nasional
http://www.antara.co.id/rss/nas.xml
Mancanegara
http://www.antara.co.id/rss/int.xml
Ekonomi & Bisnis
http://www.antara.co.id/rss/ekb.xml
Olahraga
http://www.antara.co.id/rss/ork.xml
Seni & Hiburan
http://www.antara.co.id/rss/sbh.xml
Artikel
http://www.antara.co.id/rss/art.xml
Saturday, January 17, 2009
PAS MENANG DI KUALA TRENGGANU
Friday, December 26, 2008
TURKEY TELAH MENJADI KAYA
Newfound Riches Come With Spiritual Costs for Turkey’s Religious Merchants
Ferhan Kadiroglu played with her 3-year-old daughter, Ayse, in their Istanbul home. Their family is part of Turkey’s powerful new class of wealthy Muslims.
ISTANBUL — Turkey’s religious businessmen spent years building empires on curtains, candy bars and couches. But as observant Muslims in one of the world’s most self-consciously secular states, they were never accepted by elite society.
Now that group has become its own elite, and Turkey, a more openly religious country. It has lifted an Islamic-inspired political party to power and helped make Turkey the seventh largest economy in Europe.
And while other Muslim societies are wrestling with radicals, Turkey’s religious merchant class is struggling instead with riches.
“Muslims here used to be tested by poverty,” said Sehminur Aydin, an observant Muslim businesswoman and the daughter of a manufacturing magnate. “Now they’re being tested by wealth.”
Some say religious Turks are failing that test, and they see the recent economic crisis as a lesson for those who indulged in the worst excesses of consumption, summed up in the work of one Turkish interior designer: a bathroom with faucets encrusted with Swarovski crystal, a swimming pool in the bedroom, a couch rigged to rise up to the ceiling by remote control during prayer. “I know people who broke their credit cards,” Ms. Aydin said.
But beyond the downturn, no matter how severe, is the reality: the religious wealthy class is powerful now in Turkey, a new phenomenon that poses fresh challenges not only to the old secular elite but to what good Muslims think about themselves.
Money is at the heart of the changes that have transformed Turkey. In 1950, it was a largely agrarian society, with 80 percent of its population living in rural areas. Its economy was closed and foreign currency was illegal. But a forward-looking prime minister, Turgut Ozal, opened the economy. Now Turkey exports billions of dollars in goods to other European countries, and about 70 percent of its population lives in cities.
Religious Turks helped power that rise, yet for years they were shunned by elite society. That helps explain why many are engaged in such a frantic effort to prove themselves, said Safak Cak, a Turkish interior designer with many wealthy, religious clients. “It’s because of how we labeled them,” he said. “We looked at them as black people.”
Mr. Cak was referring to Turkey’s deep class divide. An urban upper class, often referred to as White Turks, wielded the political and economic power in the country for decades. They saw themselves as the transmitters of the secular ideals of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Turkey’s founder. They have felt threatened by the rise of the rural, religious, merchant class, particularly of its political representative, Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
“The old class was not ready to share economic and political power,” said Can Paker, chairman of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, a liberal research organization in Istanbul. “The new class is sharing their habits, like driving Mercedes, but they are also wearing head scarves. The old class can’t bear this.”
“ ‘They were the peasants,’ ” the thinking goes, Mr. Paker said. “ ‘Why are they among us?’ ”
Ms. Aydin, 40, who wears a head scarf, encountered that attitude not long ago in one of Istanbul’s fanciest districts. A woman called her a “dirty fundamentalist” when Ms. Aydin tried to put trash the woman had thrown out her car window back inside.
“If you’re driving a good car, they stare at you and point,” Ms. Aydin said. “You want to say, ‘I graduated from French school just like you,’ but after a while, you don’t feel like proving yourself.”
She does not have to.
Her father started by selling curtains. Now he owns one of the largest home-appliance businesses in Europe. Ms. Aydin grew up wealthy, with tastes no different from those of the older class. She lives in a sleek, modern house with a pool in a gated community. Her son attends a prestigious private school. A business school graduate, she manages about 100 people at a private hospital founded by her father. Her head scarf bars her from employment in a state hospital.
Her husband, Yasar Aydin, shrugged. “Rich people everywhere dislike newcomers,” he said. In another decade, those prejudices will be gone, he said.
The businessmen describe themselves as Muslims with a Protestant work ethic, and say hard work deepens faith.
Friday, November 7, 2008
Kontrak Sosial Pandangan India #3
| The 'social contract' - a defining call to academia |
| Dr Collin Abraham | Oct 30, 08 4:23pm |
| Academic and professional intervention to clear the ‘muddy waters’ in the scenario of the ‘social contract’ is not only timely, but crucially long overdue. Indeed, it can be argued that this avoidance of engagement on the part of the intellectual community, can be said to be nothing more than a reflection of the neglect to engage, because of their lack or limited professional competence and capability. As a consequence, the documentation on an overview of the theoretical and pragmatic defining of social issues and concerns such as the ‘social contract’ have necessarily been a-theoretical and a-historical and the wider community is left to search blindly in attempts at further research for relevant dimensions in arriving at an acceptable consensus. Against this background, it is refreshing to note that a useful attempt has been made in this direction by the writer of the letter ‘Social Contract’ already integrated into Constitution. Indeed, this letter has successfully presented a realistic analysis that strikes at the very heart of the main issues so that it only requires supportive documentary academic, intellectual and professional evidence for an acceptable consensus for all concerned. My take on the writer’s presentation is that it basically involves the fundamental and pivotal question, that if the ‘social contract’ was that crucially important in defining the constitutional status and politico- economic relationships between the Malays and non-Malays for political independence, then surely it should have been entrenched as the ‘social contract’ within the constitution itself. In my opinion, the writer correctly argues that in the face of increasing pressure by the British that independence will only be on condition that the citizenship question among non-Malays is resolved, Umno agreed merely to incorporate the special provisions for the Malays into the constitution as the ‘social contract’. It would however be ‘simplistic’ to limit this outcome analysis to a one-factor causation. There are apparently equally important questions such as the composition of the Umno ‘mandate’ to negotiate the ‘social contract’ with the British after the majority Malay nationalist and Islamic parties withdrew from Umno, so that in fact the latter did not have the mandate to negotiate with the British for the Malay community as a whole. In other words it was the ‘elitist’ Malay political parties among the ruling class that negotiated the Malay special rights as the so-called ‘social contract’. These are serious assertions that have wide political implications across the board and must therefore be handled sensitively if they are to have the desired effect. This can be achieved if the intervention call on the academic and intellectual community to deliver could be taken up now by a leading local university such as the USM especially since it has now received the distinction of being the apex university. What is urgently needed therefore is for USM to set up a small group of say five members to review the entire question and to come up with a report and recommendations within one month. |